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THE RIGHT TO A JOB
HENRY R. BERNHARDT
The war has led to a reconsideration of a socio-legal problem which for
a long time bad remained dormant: the right to work. True, this reconsidera-
tion has tended to emphasize only one aspect of this right, namely, the right
not to be refused employment or union membership because of race, creed,
color or national origin. But the problem reaches much farther; it is not
only a question of racial discrimination, it also involves such questions as
the closed shop. Has the individual a right to live, and if so, has he a right
to use his labor to acquire the means whereby he lives?
This is, perhaps, the individual's most vital right. This article does not
propose to discuss all aspects of this right. Only the right to use one's
abilities in a dependent position (the right to a job) as well as the right to be
protected in one's employment (the right in a job) will be discussed here.
A discussion of the right to work seems timely as some steps have already
been taken to ensure and safeguard this right, while other, farther reaching
measures are under consideration in Congress and some state legislatures.
By Executive Orders No. 88021 and No. 93462 the President created a
Committee on Fair Employment Practice, which, among others, has the
duty to "receive and investigate complaints" of discrimination in employment
because of race, creed, color, or national origin. The Committee "may
conduct hearings, make findings of fact, and take appropriate steps to obtain
elimination of such discrimination." This order is addressed to all employers
and labor organizations as well as to government agencies. 3 Nothing is said
in the orders about the enforceability of the "appropriate steps" to be taken
by the Committee. Still, the Committee has issued orders to submit reports
on the number of Negroes, Jews and Catholics hired or promoted as com-
pared to the number of persons not belonging to these categories hired or
promoted, to desist from putting discriminatory "help wanted" advertise-
ments in the papers and from inserting questions as to race, religion, etc., in
questionnaires. Labor unions were directed to cease discriminatory practices,
especially to change collective agreements which made it impossible for an
employer to hire Negroes.4
16 FED. REG. 3109 (1941).
28 FED. REG. 7183 f. (1943).
SThis last point is an innovation of EXEC. ORDER 9346 (May 27. 1943), not to be
found in EXEC. ORDER 8802 (June 25, 1941)4 For further details on the Committee's practice see Discrimination in Enployntent
(1943) 3 LAWYERS GuiLD REV. 32-36.
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The weakness of the procedure was obvious. Pressure of public opinion
and, in the case of government contractors, the sensitiveness of pocketbooks
were the only factors inducing the addressees of the "orders" to comply with
them. The need for stronger measures was felt.
In February 1943, Representative Vito Marcantonio of New York intro-
duced a bill5 to end job discrimination because of race, creed, color or
national origin. The bill was intended to give the President's Committee on
Fair Employment Practice broader powers, but was addressed only to public
contractors. 6 It was referred to the Judiciary Committee and never heard of
again. In 1944, in his Annual Message to" Congress, President Roosevelt said:
We have accepted, so to speak, a second Bill of Rights under which a
new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all-regard-
less of station, race, or creed. Among these are: The right to a useful
and remunerative job in the industries, or shops or farms or mines of
the nation.7
The Republican platform for the presidential campaign of 1944 pledged "the
establishment by Federal legislation of a permanent Fair Employment Prac-
tice Commission." s
It seems, therefore, that both major parties are agreed on the necessity
of perpetuating, and of increasing the powers of, the Fair Employment
Practice Committee, which, so far, rests only on the precarious foundation
of executive orders. The existing opposition to the Committee was dis-
avowed in the Senate, which, upon the motion of Senator Buck, Republican,
from Delaware, exempted the Committee from restrictions imposed on other
"presidential" agencies by an amendment to the appropriation bill for the
Executive Office.9
In the second session of the 78th Congress four bills were introduced "to
prohibit discrimination in employment because of race, creed, color, national
origin, or ancestry." 10 All four bills declared as their policy that the denial
of employment opportunities to, and discrimination in employment against,
properly qualified persons by reasons of their race, creed, color, national ori-
gin, or ancestry "foments domestic strife and unrest, deprives the United
5H. R. 1732, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.; 89 CONG. REc. 663 (1943).
6N. Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1943, p. 8, col. 3.
7H. R. Doc. No. 377, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944) ; 90 Cong. Rec., Jan. 5, 1944, at 57.8N. Y. Times, June 28, 1944, p. 14, cols. 6, 7.9Offered by Senator Russell of Georgia, 90 Cong. Rec., March 24, 1944, at 3120-3122.1OH. R. 3986, H. R. 4004, H. R. 4005, S. 2048. These bills were sponsored by Repre-
sentatives Scanlon (Dem., Pa.), Dawson (Dem., Ill.), LaFollette (Rep., Ind.); and
Senators Chavez (Dem., N. M.), Downey (Dem., Cal.), Wagner (Dem., N. Y.)
Murray (Dem., Mont.), Capper (Rep., Kan.) and Langer (Rep., N. D.).
1945]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
States of the fullest utilization of its capacities for production and defense,
and burdens, hinders, and obstructs commerce." The bills define as "unfair
employment practices" the refusal to hire, the termination of employment,
and discrimination in compensation or other terms or conditions of employ-
ment because of a person's racial, national or religious background; further-
more, they condemn as unfair employment practice the refusal of member-
ship, expulsion, and discrimination by labor unions, if based on these reasons.
The bills were to apply to employers having more than five employees, pro-
vided the employer was engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, or was
under contract to the United States-or a federal agency, or was performing
work for the United States under a subcontract or otherwise. As far as
labor unions were concerned, they came within the purview of the bills if
they had five or more members in the employ of one or more employers
who would be subject to the bills. The employment practices of the United
States, with the exception of the enforcement rules, came under the regu-
lations of the bill.
The agency entrusted with the enforcement of the bills was called the
Fair Employment Practice Commission, and was to supersede the existing
Committee on Fair Employment Practice. The Commission, to consist of
a chairman and six members, who were to serve for seven years, was to
have the power to investigate complaints and, upon proper findings of fact,
to issue orders "to cease and desist from unfair employment practice and
to take such affirmative action, including hiring or reinstatement of em-
ployees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of the bill." 1
(Italics supplied.) The Commission was given the right to petition a circuit
court of appeals of the United States, or in some instances, a district court,
to enforce the Commission's order. The rest of the procedure was the same
as that of the National Labor Relations Act. Likewise, any person aggrieved
by a final order of the Commission could obtain a review of such order in
a circuit court of appeals. The Commission had investigatory powers and
could issue rules and regulations.
All government contracts were required to contain an "anti-discrimination"
clause.
Hearings on these bills were conducted in June, 1944, by the House Com-
mittee on Labor under the chairmanship of Representative Mary T. Norton
of New Jersey.' 2 The Committee heard only witnesses favoring the pro-
"1H. R. 3986, § 10 d.
12Hearings before the Committee on Labor on H. R. 3986, H. R. 4004 and H. R.
4005, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944) ; hereafter referred to as Hearings.
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posed bills. At the end of June, the hearings were postponed until after the
election, briefly resumed in November, and eventually discontinued entirely. 13
In spite of their incompleteness, the hearings resulted in giving an outline
of the pros and cons that are likely to be raised with regard to the proposed
legislation. On the floor of the House, Representative Rankin of Mississippi
surmised that if the white people of Indiana (the home state of Mr. La Fol-
lette, the sponsor of one of the bills) should ever "find out what that iniqui-
tous proposition is," they would count him (Mr. La Follette) out as well
as "every other white man who sponsors any such crazy legislation.' 14
This article does not propose to investigate the position of the minorities in
the United States. Admirable books have recently been published on this
subject,' 5 to which one may refer for comprehensive data on the scope of
job discrimination. The discussion here shall be confined to the constitutional
aspect of the right to work. As a constitutional discussion, it is not depend-
ent on the scope of discrimination; the points to be made are true though
there be only a "negligible" number of cases of discrimination. Even if the
cases did not show up very impressively from a purely numerical viewpoint,
they are far from negligible from the viewpoint of justice and law and from
the angle of the individuals affected.
LIBERTY OF PURSUIT
Representative Hoffman of Michigan, interrogating a witness during the
hearings on the Fair Employment bills, spoke of "some loose talk here about
the right to work" and implied that nobody had been denied this right but
only the opportunity to hold a job.18 On the other hand, Representative
Scanlon disclaimed that there was anything in his bill "about social equality."
So it seems that the problem is narrowed down to this question: is there a
right, protected by the Constitution, of free access to jobs, a right giving
every person equal econonic opportunity, if not.social equality?
Malcolm Ross, Chairman of the President's Committee on Fair Employ-
ment Practice, stated before the Committee on Labor that a person had a
public right not to be discriminated against in employment. 17 To what extent
is this contention justified by- our Constitution?
There seems to have been little doubt in the mind of our courts that the
'
3 Representative Mary T. Norton, 90 Cong. Rec., Aug. 29, 1944, at 7464.
'490 Cong. Rec., Aug. 28, 1944, at 7428.
15See, for instance, M DAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944); NORTHRUP, ORGAN-
IZED LABOR AND THE NEGRO (1944).
16Hearings, 73.
'1Id. at 161.
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right to work is a fundamental right, that it must be counted among-"the
privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several states." In 1823,
Mr. Justice Washington declared that "the right to acquire and possess
property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety" was
one of the fundamental privileges and immunities which belong, of right,
to the citizens of all free governments.' 8 In the classic decision upholding
"freedom of contract," the Supreme Court included in the term "liberty,"
as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, "the right of the citizen to be free
in the enjoyment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful
ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful
calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation."'19 This idea was expressed
even more forcefully by Mr. Justice Bradley in his concurring opinion in one
of the later Louisiana Slaughterhouse Cases.20 Here, "the right to follow any
of the common occupations of life" was declared to be an inalienable right.
According to Mr. Justice Bradley, this right was formulated as such under
the phrase "pursuit of happiness" in the Declaration of Independence and
formed "a large ingredient in the civil liberty of the citizen." The liberty
of pursuit was declared to be one of the privileges of a citizen of the United
States.
Thus far, the point has been stated in a very general fashion. The deci-
sions heretofore mentioned were intended to elucidate as to the individual's
right to make a living as an entrepreneur, rather than in a dependent posi-
tion. They express the viewpoint of the pioneer generations that every man
has a right to set up in any business free from interference of any kind. The
problem of the dependent worker had not come to the fore appreciably;
therefore, the decisions fail to deal with his position. Yet, the idea of having
a right to earn one's livelihood unmolested by third parties is of fundamental
importance both for the independent entrepreneur and for the dependent
worker.
So far, no mention has been made of the denial of the right to work because
of race, creed, color or national origin. However, in voiding a California
statute against Chinese labor, a federal court held 2 1 that "no enumeration of
the privileges, immunities . . .of man in civilized society would exclude the
18Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. No. 3230, at 551 f. (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1823) ; see also
the opinion of the court and the dissenting opinions of Field and Bradley, JJ., in the
Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 76, 97, 113-114, 21 L. ed. 395, 409, 415, 420-421
(U. S. 1872).
19Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 589, 17 Sup. Ct. 427, 431 (1897).20Butchers' Union v. Crescent City, 111 U. S. 746, 762, 764, 4 Sup. Ct. 652, 657, 658
(1884).
21I, re Parrott, 1 Fed. 481, 498 (C. C. D. Cal. 1880).
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right to labor for a living." Such right is "as sacred as the right to life,
for life is taken if the means whereby we live be taken." This is true espe-
cially in the case of foreign persons coming into the United States because
"their labor is the only exchangeable commodity they possess. To deprive
them of the right to labor is to consign them to starvation. '22 And, fol-
lowing this reasoning, Mr. Justice Hughes wrote the opinion of the Supreme
Court invalidating an Arizona law requiring that in all enterprises employ-
ing more than five persons at least eighty per cent of the employees must be
"qualified electors or native-born citizens of the United States." He found
that to deny to lawfully admitted aliens the opportunity to earn a livelihood
would be tantamount to denying them entrance, "for .. . they cannot live
where they cannot work." The result would be segregation of aliens in the
more progressive states.
23
On the basis of all this, it may be safely stated that the courts, throughout
our history, have considered the right to work as a right that flows both
from the right to live and the right to own and acquire property. It is held
that this right is "a property right, is incident to the freedom of the indi-
vidual, and is as fully protected by the law as any other personal or private
right."24
The statement that every person, regardless of color or national origin, has
a right to work has been repeated so many times in the "country of unlimited
opportunities" that its repetition here may sound trite. The question which
is far more controversial is this: is the claim justified that the right to work
is protected?. This question can be answered with an unqualified "yes" only
if we establish that the law demands respect for the right to work from
(a) the government, (b) third persons, (c) employers, and (d) fellow-
employees.
DUTY OF GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES
American law contains surprisingly little information on the question of
whether the government has a duty to safeguard a person's right to work.
On the other hand, many foreign countries have, or had, constitutional pro-
visions establishing and guaranteeing the right to work. Germany's defunct
Weimar constitution of 1919 provided in its Article 163, § 2: "Every German
shall have the opportunity to earn his living by economic labor. So long
as suitable employment cannot be procured for him, his maintenance will
221d. at 506.
23Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 42, 36 Sup. Ct. 7, 11 (1915).
2411 Am. Jun., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 338.
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be provided for." This opened the way not only to the establishment of
job opportunities by the state (public works, public employment services)
but gave the unemployed a constitutional right to unemployment relief. The
right to work is, or was, further guaranteed in the constitutions or other
fundamental laws of Argentina,2 Bolivia,26 Costa Rica,27 Lithuania,2 8 Nica-
ragua,2 9 Paraguay,30 Portugal31 and Spain.32 Article 118 of the 1936 Soviet
constitution states: "Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to work, that
is the right to receive guaranteed work with payment for their work in ac-
cordance with its quantity or quality." This guarantee is obviously based
on the dogma that the Soviet government is the only employer. 38 It has been
stated that the "opportunity for suitable employment for all who seek work"
belongs to the "widely recognised objects of social policy to the general
principle of which the United Nations are already pledged by the Consti-
tution of the International Labour Organization, the Atlantic Charter . . .
and other instruments and statements of policy."'3 4 To provide this oppor-
tunity is the ultimate responsibility of the State.as
The "next best thing" to a guarantee of the right to work, namely, un-
employment relief, is now fully accepted in the United States.30 Yet, the
Federal Government has failed, so far, to exercise its powers to impose non-
discriminatory standards. This in spite of the fact that discrimination by
municipalities against members of minorities employed by the municipality
has been condemned by a federal court as violative of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in the case of Negro teachers in public schools who received a lower
salary than their white colleagues of equal training.8 7 A valuable precedent
was set by the Walsh-Healey Act of June 30, 1936,38 but this act simply
2Constitution of the Argentine Nation as amended 1860, 1866, and 1898, Art. 14.26PolitiCal Constitution of Bolivia of Oct. 30, 1938, Art. 6 (b).27Constitution of the Republic of Costa Rica of Dec. 7, 1871, as amended 1942, Art. 52.28Constitution of May 15, 1928, Art. 89.29Constitution of the Republic of Nicaragua of March 22, 1939, Art. 96.
30Constitution of the Republic of Paraguay of July 10, 1940, Art. 19.3 1National Labor Statute of Sept. 23, 1933, Art. 21.32Constitution of the Spanish Republic of Dec. 9, 1931, Art. 46; Labor Charter of
March 9, 1938, c. I, Arts. 3 and 8.SsFor the foregoing see INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, CoNSTnUTIoMTAL PROVISIONS
CONCERNING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY (1944), passim.
34Id. at Introduction, xv.
351d. at Introduction, xvi.3 6 SocIAL S.cuaRr. Acv 49 STAT. 626 (1935), 42 U. S. C. § 501 f. (1940); upheld
in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 586-587, 57 Sup. Ct. 883, 890-891(1937) (as promoting the general welfare; the unemployment problem was held to be
"national in area and dimension").37Alston v. School Board of Norfolk, 112 F. (2d) 992 (C. C. A. 4th, 1940), cert.
denied, 311 U. S. 693, 61 Sup. Ct. 75 (1940).
3849 STAT. 2036 (1936), 41 U. S. C. §§ 35-45 (1940).
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laid down the rule that government contracts should be awarded only if
the contractor undertook to abide by certain maximum hours and minimum
wages. It failed, however, to use the government's high credit rating to hold
contractors to strict compliance with the National Labor Relations Act;39
nor, prior to the President's Executive Order No. 934640 did the government
impose any rules outlawing racial discrimination by public contractors and
government agencies. The express addition of a reference to government
agencies in the order indicates the occurrence of discrimination by such
agencies.
On the other hand, the Federal Government has successfully undertaken
to discharge its duty to provide jobs. By the Act of June 6, 1933,'4 1 the United
States Employment Service was created, whose "province and duty" was
declared to be "to promote and develop a national system of employment
offices." 42 The Service, originally located in the Department of Labor, was
transferred under Reorganization Plan No. I, effective July 1, 1939, to the
Federal Security Agency, where it was consolidated with the unemployment
compensation function of the Social Security Board.4 From there Executive
Order No. 9247 of 194244 transferred it to the War Manpower Commission.
It is thus evident that the Federal Government has taken the necessary
steps to discharge its duty toward the citizen looking for work.
VIOLATIONS OF RIGHT TO JOB BY THIRD PERSONS
The law is even less definite with regard to protection of the right to
work against interference by third persons (that is, persons who are neither
employers nor fellow-employees of the aggrieved person). Even in cases
where a person is deprived of a job he already holds, the law is not clear as
to whether such deprivation constitutes an actionable wrong. The decision
of the Supreme Court in Hodges v. United States" refuses to recognize any
constitutional job protection and declares federal legislation to be inapplicable
to such a case. In that case, a number of white men had been indicted for
conspiracy to intimidate citizens in the free exercise or enjoyment of rights
and privileges secured to them by the Constitution of the United States. 40
Several white men had threatened some Negroes, forcing them to leave
39Opinion of the Attorney-General, 9 U. S. L. WEEK 2230, 2231 (1940).
408 FED. REG. 7183 f. (1943).
4148 STAT. 114, 29 U. S. C. § 49 d (1940).
4248 STAT. 114, 29 U. S. C. § 49 b (1940).
434 FED. REG. 2727 (1939), 53 STAT. 1423 (1939), 5 U. S. C. § 133 t, n. (1940).
447 FEiD. REG. 7379 (1942). 50 U. S. C Apo. § 601. n. (Supp. 1943).
-10  u. A. 1, 25 bup. Lt. U (.1906).46Rzv. STAr. § 5508 (1875), 18 U. S. C. § 51 (1940).
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their jobs. The Court held that this action did not constitute a conspiracy
within the meaning of the federal statute. The Attorney-General, prose-
cuting the case, thought it "vain to contend that the Federal Constitution
secures to a citizen of the United States the right to work at a given occu-
pation or particular calling free from injury, oppression, or interference by
individual citizens. Even though the right be a natural or inalienable right,
the duty of protecting the citizen in the enjoyment of such right, free from
individual interference, rests alone with the State."47 The Court adopted
this reasoning,48 while Harlan and Day, JJ., dissenting, claimed that it was
"no longer open to question . . . that Congress may, by appropriate legisla-
tion, protect any privilege arising from, created or secured by, or dependent
upon the Constitution or laws of the United States." 49 The position of the
Court was based, to a large degree, on United States v. Cruikshank,50 while
the dissent relied on U.nited States v. Reese5' and Logan v. United States.5 2
However, even those cases that permitted appropriate federal legislation to
protect the rights based on the post-war amendments referred only to such
legislation that would prevent the states from discriminating in the ways for-
bidden by the amendments. Mr. Justice Gray, speaking for the Court in the
Logan case, stated expressly that the "fundamental rights, recognized and
declared, but not granted or created, in some of the Amendments to the
Constitution, are thereby guaranteed only against violation or abridgment by
the United States, or by the States, as the case may be, and cannot there
fore be affirmatively enforced by Congress against unlawful acts of indi-
viduals."
It seems, on the basis of these decisions, that the more "fundamental" a
right, the less protected is it under the Constitution, except as against in-
fringing legislation. There seems to be a dictum to the contrary in one of
Mr. Justice Bradley's opinions in the Circuit Court,54 where he declares that
individual interference with a person's exercise of his equal rights as a citi-
zen because of his race may be prohibited by Congress. The example given
by him is that of a Negro or an Indian leasing a farm in a white community
and expelled by a combination of white persons. However, in writing the
opinion of the Supreme Court voiding the Civil Rights Act of 1875 the
47Hodges v. United States, 203 U. S. 9, 27 Sup. Ct. 6, 11 (1906).
481d. at 18, 27 Sup. Ct. at 9.
491d. at 24, 27 Sup. Ct. at 11-12.
5092 U. S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588 (1875).
5192 U. S. 214, 23 L. ed. 478 (1875).52144 U. S. 263, 293, 12 Sup. Ct. 617, 626 (1892).
WIbid.54United States v. Cruikshank, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,897, at 712 (C. C. D. La. 1874).
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same Justice held that "civil rights . .. cannot be impaired by the wrongful
acts of individuals"; redress, if at all, can be had only by resorting to the
laws of the State. "Legislation cannot properly cover the whole domain
of rights appertaining to life, liberty and property, defining them and pro-
viding for their vindication." 55
This opinion is clothed in too sweeping a language to be interpreted only
as inveighing against federal legislation to protect social rights, such as equal
accommodation on public means of transportation; it is a clear indication
that federal legislation to protect fundamental rights was frowned upon by
the Supreme Court. However, it may be added here that the constitution
of New York provides that "No person shall, because of race, color, creed or
religion, be subjected to any discrimination in his civil rights by any other
person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the state or any
agency or subdivision of the state." 56
This may be the appropriate place to classify the right to work, which was
so amply praised and upheld by the Supreme Court, especially at the turn
of the last century. Is it on the same level with the right of "full and equal
enjoyment of the accommodations . . . of inns, public conveyances ....
theaters and other places of public amusement" ?57 The answer is obvious.
Denial of "equal enjoyment of accommodation," while unjustly humiliating,
does not deprive a person of the essentials of life. The denial of the right
to work does. Therefore, the statement that social intercourse cannot be en-
forced by law, does not apply to the problem of the enforceability of the right
to work. The right to work is far more than a "social right"; it is a neces-
sary incident of the right to live,58 and it may also be considered as property.59
VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO JOB BY EMPLOYER OR PROSPECTIVE
EMPLOYER
While there seems to be little doubt about the fundamental character of
the right, the right seems to be ill protected against encroachment by em-
ployers or fellow-workers.
One of the most potent weapons of an employer, in infringing upon a per-
son's right to work, is the blacklist. True, a number of states outlaw black-
5SCivil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 13, 17, 3 Sup. Ct. 18, 25-26, 27 (1883).56N. Y. CoNs?. Art. I, § 11 (amended 1938) ; (italics supplied).
57Civ RIGHTs AcT, 18 STAT. (Pt. III) 335 (1875).58Truax v. Raich, mipra note 23.
59Goldfield Consolidated Mines v. Goldfield Miners Union, 159 Fed. 500, 515 (C. C. D.
Nev. 1908).
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listing;60 some states even prohibit blacklisting in their constitutions ;61
others go so far as to forbid constitutionally any malicious interference on
the part of individuals or corporations with a person's obtaining or enjoying
employment. 62 However, the constitutionality of the prohibition of blacklist-
ing is doubtful. In some jurisdictions, such laws have been declared uncon-
stitutional ;63 others have upheld them. 64 But even where these laws were
allowed to stand, they were applied only infrequently.65 Laws attaching
punishment to blacklisting seem to have been applied less than five times.66
Wherever 'civil action was taken against one utilizing a blacklist, the issue
turned either on the question of damages or on the more fundamental con-
sideration of the employer's freedom to hire and not to hire whom he pleased.
Thus, blacklisting without proof of damages was declared to be not action-
able.6 7 Courts went even so far as to brand as erroneous the idea that em-
ployers should not have the right to combine freely to refuse employment
to any kind or class of workmen,68 and it was held that any person might
refuse to employ whomever he might wish and could not be "called upon to
answer for his. judgment in that regard by the public or individuals; nor
can the motives which prompted that action be considered." 69 One court went
to great lengths in extolling the right to work as part of every man's civil
rights, claiming that wrongful prevention from pursuing a calling repre-
sented an actionable injury. A touching picture was drawn of the man's,
and "perchance" his wife's and children's "penury and want," and "humanity"
was invoked as demanding "redress of a wrong which is followed by such
lamentable consequences." The very same decision, however, considers it an
equally fundamental right of the employer "to refuse to enter into business
relations, whether such refusal be the result of reason, or of whim, caprice,
prejudice or malice."7 ° On the other hand, we find a court protecting, in
equity, the right to work of blacklisted strikers. The court even condemns
6 0DANGEL AND SHRIBER, THE LAW OF LABOR UNIONS (1941), § 85; Wrrr, THE
GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DISPUTES (1932), 213.6 1Auz. CONST. Art. XVIII, § 9; N. D. CONST. Art. XVII, § 212; UTAH CONST.
Art XII, § 19, Art. XVI, § 4.
62N. D. CoNsT. Art. I, § 23; UTAH CoNsT. Art. XII, § 19.
63Wabash R.R. v. Young, 162 Ind. 102, 69 N. E. 1003 (1904).64State v. Justus, 85 Minn. 279, 88 N. W. 759 (1902) ; Joyce v. Great Northern Ry.,
100 Minn. 225, 110 N. W. 975 (1907).65 WITrE, op. cit. supra note 60, at 215.
66See, e.g. State v. Dabney, 141 P. (2d) 303 (Okla. Cr. App. 1943) ; WITTE, loc. cit.
supra, mentions two cases.
67Willner v. Silverman, 109 Md. 341, 71 AtI. 962 (1909).68Atkins v. Fletcher, 65 N. J. Eq. 658, 661, 55 At. 1074, 1075 (Ch. 1903).
NNew York, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Schaffer, 65 Ohio St. 414, 62 N. E. 1036 (1902).
70Hundley v. Louisville & N. R.R., 105 Ky. 162, 164-165, 48 S. W. 429, 430 (1898).
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interference by an individual with the right to work,71 while usually a con-
spiracy must be proven in such cases. When a conspiracy assumed the pro-
portions of a combination in restraint of trade, the Supreme Court applied
the Sherman Act to it.72
On the basis of these decisions legal protection of the right to work seems
to be deficient. Even where a person already has a job. he is ill protected:
the employer's right to fire him arbitrarily is uncontested. Neither is the
power to withhold employment from a person effectively limited, and inter-
ference by third persons with the employment relation is, at best, remedied
by damage suits, with strict proof of the damage required to make the inter-
ference an actionable wrong.
This is a far cry from the resounding phrases upholding the right to work
as an essential factor of the individual's very life, but the legal situation
seems to be even less favorable in the case of a person who does not have
a job, is looking for employment, and finds himself arbitrarily discriminated
against by a prospective employer, either for no good reason at all or on
account of the applicant's race, creed, color, or national origin. The courts73
do not give protection against "whim, caprice, prejudice or malice" in re-
fusing employment to a person.
During the hearings on the Fair Employment Practice bills Congressmen
Hoffman of Michigan and Fisher of Texas objected strongly to any legis-
lation establishing a commission telling an employer whom he could hire
or fire. This "would take from the employer ... any freedom of action that
he has enjoyed since the Constitution was written. . . . [It] would rob the
employer of his traditional freedom of choice of those whom he wishes to
employ on the basis of what he feels is best for his own business. ' 74 To
those who fall by the wayside in their quest of employment, Mr. Hoffman
gave the advice to establish a business of their own; here no discrimination
would make itself felt.75
It seems that "freedom of contract" still plays an important part in the
minds of our legislators; this, in spite of the fact that this concept has been
rendered obsolete, to a large extent, by the National Labor Relations Act
and kindred legislation. There is no need here to go again into the opinions
of the Supreme Court upholding the validity of the Wagner Act, but it
71Cornellier v. Haverhill Shoe Mfrs. Ass'n, 221 Mass. 554, 559-560, 109 N. E. 643,
644-645 (1915).72Anderson v. Shipowners Ass'n, 272 U. S. 359, 47 Sup. Ct. 472 (1926).73See note 70 supra.7 4Hearings, 62 f.
75M. at 74.
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should be mentioned that, according to the Supreme Court, the Wagner
Act "does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right of the employer
to select its employees or to discharge them."7 6 The Wagner Act outlaws
discrimination in regard to "hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization. '77 In numerous decisions the courts, including the
Supreme Court, have upheld the right of the employee not to be discharged
because of union affiliation. More than that, in the interpretation given it
by the Supreme Court, the Wagner Act did away with blacklisting, at least
to the extent of outlawing blacklisting because of union activities. In a num-
ber of decisions of recent date the courts have interpreted Section 8 (3) of
the Wagner Act to include not only discriminatory discharge but discrimi-
natory refusal to hire as well. In National Labor Relations Board v. Waum-
bec Mills,7s a mill had refused to employ applicantg for the lone reason that
they had a "union record," their experience and qualifications being beyond
doubt. The court declared this to be an unfair labor practice and upheld
the National Labor Relations Board's order to the mill to offer employment,
with back pay. to the applicants.79 The court said: "This emphatically does
not mean that an employer may not lawfully decline to employ a union
applicant. . . . The statutory test is whether the applicant was rejected . . .
on account of union membership or activity, or on account of some permis-
sible criterion."80 In the case of Nevada Consolidated Copper Corporation,8 '
the Board likewise ordered the "instatement" of persons whom the prospec-
tive employer discriminatorily had refused to hire, which order was implicitly
upheld by the Supreme Court. 12 The Court has accepted the theory that
discriminatory refusal to hire is covered by the Wagner Act.8 3 Speaking
through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, it stated again that this interpretation
of the Wagner Act did not "impose an obligation on the employer to favor
union members in hiring employees. He is as free to hire as he is to dis-
charge employees. The statute . . . is directed solely against the abuse of
76National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin, 301 U. S. 1, 45, 57 Sup. Ct.
615, 628 (1937).
77Sec. 8 (3), 49 STAT. 452, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (3) (1940).
78114 F. (2d) 226 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940).
791d. at 233, 235.801d. at 234; but see National Labor Relations Board v. National Casket Co., 107
F. (2d) 992, 997 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
8126 N. L. R. B. 1182 (1940).
82National Labor Relations Board v. Nevada Consolidated Copper Corp., 316 U. S.
105, 62 Sup. Ct. 960 (1942).83Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313 U. S. 177, 61 Sup. Ct.
845, 133 A. L. R. 1217, 1235 (1941).
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that right by interfering with the countervailing right of self-organization. 8 4
Murphy and Stone, JJ., partially dissenting, agreed with the majority of
the Court in declaring a discriminatory refusal to hire to be a violation of
the Wagner Act and an unfair labor practice. This view has become the
established opinion of the courts.8 5
It is thus accepted that a person who has been refused employment on
account of union affiliation may obtain redress, not merely in the form of
damages, but in the form of the employment he was seeking. It is even held
(though not unanimously) that he may be given a claim for back pay, dating
from the day he was refused employment to the day he was employed fol-
lowing the Board's order.
Now, if this form of discrimination on account of union activities is out-
lawed, the outlawing of job discrimination on account of race, creed, color,
national origin or ancestry must be all the more constitutionally valid. Union
affiliation is created more or less voluntarily; its purpose is to obtain bar-
gaining equality with the employer and thus to win better conditions of
employment. The right of self-organization has been approved by federal
statute and by the courts, and discrimination on account of union activities
has been condemned as disturbing industrial peace. Arguing a minore ad
mnaius, racial, etc., discrimination must be considered as "burdening or ob-
structing interstate or foreign commerce." All "minorities" taken together,
exceed the number of unionized workers by far. True, minorities, being
largely unorganized, do not have the weapon of the strike, which is at the
disposal of organized labor, and thus they cannot resort, as minorities, to
walkouts which might endanger interstate and foreign commerce and indus-
trial peace, but it would be more than inequitable to deny them relief because
they are less dangerous to industrial peace (a situation which may some day
change). They are discriminated against not for something they did out
of their own free will, such as joining a union, but for something with which
they were born: the color of their skins, their creed, their national origin.
The Supreme Court has recognized the parallel between the positions of union
workers, persecuted and discriminated against because of their union affilia-
84Id. at 186-187, 61 Sup. Ct. at 849, 133 A. L. R. at 1235 (1941).8 5National Labor Relations Board v. Milan Shirt Mfg. Co., 125 F. (2d) 376 (C. C. A.
6th, 1942) ; National Labor Relations Board v. Chattanooga Bakery, 127 F. (2d) 201,
204 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942), cert. denied 317 U. S. 676, 63 Sup. Ct. 157 (1942) ; National
Labor Relations Board v. Moore-Lowry Flour Mills, 122 F. (2d) 419, 426 (C. C. A.
10th, 1941); National Labor Relations Board v. Security Warehouse, 136 F. (2d) 829,
834 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943). For earlier Board orders to the same effect see Kelly-Spring-
field Tire Co., 6 N. L. R. B. 325 (1938); Knoxville Publishing Co., 12 N. L. R. B.
1209 (1939).
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tion, and of members of minority groups. The latter's "desire for fair and
equitable conditions of employment . . . and the removal of discriminations
against them . . . is quite as important to those concerned as fairness and
equity in terms and conditions of employment can be to trade or craft
unions .... Race discrimination by an employer may reasonably be deemed
more unfair and less excusable than discrimination against workers on the
ground of union affiliation. 86
The fear. expressed by opponents of the proposed Fair Employment Prac-
tice bills,8 7 that employees would be forced upon an unwilling employer by
action of a government agency, is not any more justified than the fear that
union men would be forced upon an anti-union employer. It is still his right
to refuse employment to a person whom he does not want to employ. The
Supreme Court's decisions upholding the employer's right of selection would
be directly applicable in cases of racial discrimination. True, the task of the
board or commission that deals with unfair employment practice would be
as "delicate" as that of the National Labor Relations Board when it delves
into the motive for the refusal to hire an applicant.88 There are many legiti-
mate reasons for not wanting to have a person in one's employ. However,
it is established that an unfair labor practice on the part of -an employer
makes his ordinary right to select his employees "vulnerable" ;89 his "freedom
to hire" is modified and the relation between him and the persons he dis-
criminated against is no longer based on purely private law, but veers into
the realm of public law.
It appears thus that the law, at least in recent times, has developed so as
to make the right to work something more tangible than a mere rhetorical
expression. It is now universally admitted that the right to work "constitutes
a property right, the continued interference with which equity will enjoin
where the legal remedy is inadequate."90 This statement applies directly to
all cases where an employee is deprived of his job by a malicious act, but
it must also apply, at least by analogy, to cases where an applicant is mali-
ciously refused employment, especially in cases of racial discrimination. The
Waumbec and Phelps Dodge decisions point the way in the right direction.
80New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552, 561, 58 Sup. Ct. 703,
707 (1938).8TSee, e.g. Congressman 0. C. Fisher of Texas, Hearings, 86-87.8SNational Labor Relations Board v. Waumbec Mills, 114 F. (2d) 226, 234 (C. C. A.
1st, 1940).89Black Diamond S.S. Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 94 F. (2d) 875,
879 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938), cert. denied 304 U. S. 579, 58 Sup. Ct. 1044 (1938).9ODorrington v. Manning, 135 Pa. Super. 194, 201, 4 A. (2d) 886, 890 (1939).
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VIOLATION OF RIGHT TO A JOB BY FELLOW EMPLOYEES
While the right to work is recognized as against the unfairly discriminating
employer, its protection against fellow-workers is less securely founded in
law. It is strange to see that at a time when unions were frowned upon as
conspiracies, their right to admit, or refuse admission to, applicants for mem-
bership, was fully recognized on the ground that they were voluntary and
obviously lawful private associations. In Mayer v. Journeyntez Stonecutters
Ass'n,91 it was held that no court had power "to require the admission of
any person to original membership in any voluntary association," such as
trade unions. "No person has any abstract right to be admitted to such
membership; that depends solely upon the action of the society." While
decisions like that might have worked relatively little damage to the unsuc-
cessful applicant for membership at a time when the unionization of indus-
tries was still in its initial stages, we might expect a change of opinion in
the more recent period of our history when unions, far from being outlawed,
were tolerated, and, even more recently, encouraged and their activities pro-
tected. Nevertheless, many courts continue to follow the doctrine of the union
as a voluntary private association, which may grant or deny membership at
will, and this although the union dominates the labor market by way of
closed-shop agreements. 92 Even if the arbitrary rejection of the candidate
prejudices his material interest, no court of equity, it has been held, will
interfere with the union's decision.93 The advent of the New Deal labor
legislation, immeasurably strengthening the position of union labor, did not
change the outlook for the rejected candidate. Few people seemed to realize
that, once union labor was no longer the underdog, there might be other
underdogs requiring at least as much protection under the law as union
labor had struggled for and won. The unions, having disposed of discrimi-
nation against themselves with the help of powerful federal legislation, nov
practised the same discrimination freely, while at the same time monopolizing
jobs in important centers of industry by closed-shop agreements. The Wag-
ner Act, breaking down the bars to collective bargaining, did not provide
for the non-union worker, desirous of joining a union of his own choosing, in
case the union chose not to accept him as a member. The courts adhered
to the old doctrine, unmindful of the fact that membership in a union, in
9147 N. J. Eq. 519, 524, 20 Atl. 492, 494 (Ch. 1890).
92 These agreements are expressly protected by Sec. 8 (3) of the Wagner Act, 49
STAT. 452, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (3) (1940).
93Harris v. Thomas, 217 S. W. 1068, 1076-1077 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); Simons v.
Berry, 210 App. Div. 90, 205 N. Y. S. 442 (1st Dep't 1924) ; Greenwood v. Building
Trades Council, 71 Cal. App. 159, 172, 233 Pac. 823, 828 (1925).
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many fields of industry, was no longer merely a factor in obtaining better
working conditions, but had become an indispensable factor in getting any
work at all. In the late 'thirties, the courts still disclaimed power to force
a person's admission upon a union.94 The New York Court of Appeals has
held that "a union, with perhaps some exceptions not material here, is free
to choose its own members."' ' Though the decisions are discouraging, it
is heartening to note that one of these decisions at least raised the question
of what is to become of the rejected applicant who is unable to obtain em-
ployment at his chosen vocation because he is not a member of the union.
However, the court threw this problem, one of public policy, into the lap of
the legislature and refused to grant relief.96
The courts, about the turn of the century, had been very favorably in-
clined toward recognition of the worker's right not to join a union. Freedom
of contract was freely quoted as upholding the worker's "constitutional right"
to enter into a "yellow-dog" contract.97 Now the issue is reversed, and the
courts protect the union's right to refuse admission to applicants at will,
although unions have come to be, with the blessing of the law, dispensers
of jobs.
However, here, too, a trend away from the "private" concept of the union
becomes distinct. The danger of a job monopoly in the hands of unions has
not been overlooked. Strikes for the purpose of doing away altogether with
non-union labor and of gaining a general monopoly of the labor market have
been declared unlawful.98 Concerted labor action based on racial discrimi-
nation was enjoined in an Ohio case.99 Here a union picketed an eating
place because it employed non-union colored help. The colored employees
applied to the union to form a local for colored restaurant employees and
the union refused. The court held that this was not a fight of union men
against non-union men but a case of white men opposing colored men and
indirectly protected the colored men's jobs by granting the employer's peti-
tion for an injunction. Strikes and other concerted labor action have been
outlawed if they were begun with the primary purpose of injuring others
04Maguire v. Buckley, 301 Mass. 355, 360, 17 N. E. (2d) 170, 172 (1938) ; Shein v.
Rose, 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 87, 89 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; Murphy v. Higgins, 12 N. Y. S. (2d)
913, 915 (Sup. Ct. 1939), affd without opinion, 260 App. Div. 854, 23 N. Y. S. (2d)
552 (1st Dep't 1940).95Boro Park Market v. Heller, 280 N. Y. 481, 487, 21 N. E. (2d) 687, 688 (1939);
italics supplied.9GMiller v. Ruehl, 166 Misc. 479, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 394 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
07Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277 (1908) ; Coppage v. Kansas,
236 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240 (1915).9sFolsom Engraving Co. v. McNeil, 235 Mass. 269, 278, 126 N. E. 479, 480 (1920).
09Wills v. Restaurant Employees, 26 Ohio N. P. (xi. s.) 435 (C. P. 1927).
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without promoting the interests of those taking the action.'O° Even in a case
where the union dominated the whole field of an enterprise (the New York
transportation system), the court upholding the right to strike for the purpose
of excluding non-union men, stated that the strike must not be conducted
"simply and solely for the purpose of keeping [non-union employees] out
of work."''1 1
An even more notable breach in the doctrine of the "private" character of
unions was accomplished in Dorrington v. Manning,1° 2 where the court held
that the refusal, without reason, of admission to a union, followed by a strike
of the union members to expel the applicants from their employment, con-
stituted a malicious act. These decisions, however, have to do only with
the injury inflicted upon employed non-union workers by the union.
But in other cases the courts have held more generally that job monopolies
held by unions are unlawful. A Connecticut decision condemned the sweep-
ing closed-shop agreement, i.e. one "which takes in an entire industry of any
considerable proportions in a community, so that it operates generally in
that community, to prevent or to seriously deter craftsmen from working at
their craft, or workingmen from obtaining employment under favorable con-
ditions without joining a union." The court waxed bitter over "monopolies
of things of common use and need, whether created by governmental grant
or by the acts of private persons or corporations. . . . [Such monopolies]
are especially intolerable where they concern the basic resource of individual
existence, the capacity to labor."' 0 While this decision might not carry too
much weight, having been handed down at a time when unions were more
than slightly suspected of sinister doings, the idea of the unlawful character
of'a job monopoly is sound. This idea was more clearly interpreted in a
number of New Jersey decisions. In Harris v. Geier,10 4 the court pointed
dut the vital importance of union membership for workers in union-domi-
nated trades. While a dissatisfied stockholder of a corporation may sell his
stock and invest elsewhere, a dissatisfied union member "can resign-and
starve." While the case had to do only with an intra-union controversy, the
court made a far more general statement by demanding that unions, to be
lawful, must be "governed on democratic principles" and that membership
00See e.g. Cohn & Roth v. Bricklayers' Union, 92 Conn. 161, 101 At. 659 (1917).01Williarns v. Quill, 277 N. Y. 1, 7, 12 N. E. (2d) 547, 549 (1938) ; appeal dismissed,
303 U. S. 621, 58 Sup. Ct. 650 (1938).
102135 Pa. Super. 194, 4 A. (2d) 886 (1939) ; see also RESTATEMtENT, TORTS (1939)
§ 810.
l°aConnors v. Connolly, 86 Conn. 641, 651, 86 Atl. 600, 603, 604 (1913); Polk v.
Cleveland Ry., 20 Ohio App. 317, 321, 151 N. E. 808, 810 (1925).
104112 N. J. Eq. 99, 106, 108, 164 At. 50, 53 (Ch. 1932).
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in them must be "open, on reasonable terms, to all persons of good character
and of skill in the trade."
Wherever a union has a substantial monopoly by having concluded closed-
shop agreements with a sizable majority of the shops in a given field of in-
dustry, such monopoly creates duties which may be enforced against the
possessors of the monopoly. "A union may restrict its membership at pleas-
ure; it may, under certain conditions, lawfully contract with employers that
all work shall be given to its members. But it cannot do both."'10 5 However,
a distinctidn must be drawn between a closed shop in a single factory, or
group of factories, and a closed shop in substantially an entire industry
throughout a considerable area. In the latter case there is the further dis-
tinction between a closed shop sought by a union as a protective measure,
and one sought in order to create a monopoly of labor. "By the great weight
of authority," it has been held, "the last case is . . . contrary to public
policy."' 0 6 Some decisions go even farther. A Massachusetts decision held
that a union which had a closed-shop or a preferential agreement with an
employer "would open itself to serious criticism if it refused to admit to
membership men qualified to perform the work done by members of the
union in question."' 1 7 As Ludwig Teller 08 aptly formulates it:
Labor unions are no holier than the workers who compose them, nor
are non-union workers outcasts of the industrial life except, in a realistic
sense, to the extent that the industrial economy is unable to afford them
employment. Labor unions which close their ranks to the public thereby
assume a sovereignty which it is not theirs to assume. The closed shop
at the hands of a labor union which substantially excludes the public
from its benefits . . . is a means whereby an anti-social monopoly is
foisted upon the industrial body politic.' 0 9
Another aspect of the problem was dealt with in the case of Cameron v.
International Alliance.10 Here the union management had discriminated
between "senior" and "junior" members, imposing heavier dues and offering
less employment opportunities to the latter. The court, while upholding the
union's right to refuse membership to applicants, condemned "arbitrary or
capricious discrimination between the members of the union in respect of
lo5Wilson v. Newspaper and Mail Deliverers' Union, 123 N. J. Eq. 347, 351, 197 Atl.
720, 722 (Ch. 1938).
10 6Four Plating Co. v. Mako, 122 N. 3. Eq. 298, 300, 194 Atl. 53, 55 (Ch. 1937).
'
07Shinsky v. O'Neil, 232 Mass. 99, 104, 121 N. E. 790, 792 (1919).
108TELLR, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1940), Vol. I, § 99.
'O9Quoted with approval in Schwab v. Moving Picture Machine Operators, 165 Ore.
602, 623-624, 109 P. (2d) 600, 608 (1941).
110118 N. J. Eq. 11, 176 Atl. 692 (1935).
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equality of opportunity to work." ' This was followed by a later decision 12
wherein the "claim that all jobs within the jurisdiction of the union are the
property of the local" was called "modified slavery." A similar recognition
of the vital importance of union membership can be found in the decision
of the New York Court of Appeals overruling Simons v. Berry.11-3 Expul-
sion from a union, it was held, may mean the impossibility for the expelled
worker to find employment in his trade; if the expulsion was done arbi-
trarily, equitable relief should be granted to prevent irreparable injury."14
While a certain duty is thus recognized on the part of unions not to
bar their ranks to qualified workers and to treat their members with equality,
a federal court has upheld a union's right to establish "separate lodges" for
its colored members, these lodges to be represented in union board or con-
vention meetings "by the delegates of the nearest white local." Such an
action, having been taken by a private association and not by a state govern-
ment, was not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; therefore, the
court was without jurisdiction in the matter.n 5 A union's right to enter into
an agreement with an employer under which white union members were
preferred to colored union members, regardless of seniority, was upheld for
the same reason; the federal court refused to take jurisdictioh because no
federal constitutional issue was involved. It admitted that the appellant had
a grievance and suggested that "somewhere must reside judicial power to
adjudicate it, and grant him and others of his class adequate relief," but
claimed that it was not within the court's province to say how and where.:" 6
In another case, however, the question was whether a railroad brotherhood
that made colored personnel ineligible for membership could be considered
the designated bargaining agent for "Red-Caps" who never had an oppor-
tunity to vote for the brotherhood as the union of their choosing. In this
instance a federal court refused to recognize the union as the representative
of the "Red-Caps."" 7
However, an important new interpretation of the law concerning lAbor
unions has been developed here, culminating in two significant deci-
"'Id. at 26, 176 At. at 699-700.112 Collins v. International Alliance, 119 N. J. Eq. 230, 242, 182 Atl. 37, 44 (Ch. 1935).
l"3 Simons v. Berry, 210 App. Div. 90, 205 N. Y. Supp. 442 (1st Dep't 1924).
11 4Simons v. Berry, 240 N. Y. 463, 148 N. E. 636 (1925).
"15 Natonal Federation of Railway Workers v. National Mediation Board, 110 F. (2d)
529, 537 (App. D. C. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U. S. 628, 60 Sup. Ct. 975 (1940).
"
6Teague v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 127 F. (2d) 53, 56 (C. C. A. 6th,
1942).
ltBrotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks v. United Transport Service Em-
ployees, 137 F. (2d) 817 (App. D. C. 1943).
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sions of the United States Supreme Court of December 18, 1944. In
1931, a state court had to deal with the question of whether a colored
railroad employee who was excluded from membership in the union because
of his race, was entitled to union wages as stipulated in the collective agree-
ment negotiated by the union as exclusive bargaining representative for the
whole craft in a certain district. The court held 18 that in such a case the
union wages must apply to all employees of the railroad regardless of color
or union membership, and this opinion was followed in a federal decision." 9
Recently, the Supreme Court went considerably farther in the same direc-
tion.120 Again the problem was that of discrimination against a colored
man by a union that did not accept colored members. The union was a
brotherhood of railroad employees. It bad been chosen by the majority of
the employees (colored personnel, not being members, of course could not
vote) to be their bargaining agent. This meant that under the Railway Labor
Act it was the exclusive bargaining agent for all employees. The Court,
speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Stone, deviated from earlier federal deci-
sions and assumed jurisdiction because a federal statute, the Railway Labor
Act, had to be interpreted. It held that Congress, in granting exclusiveness
of representation to the union chosen by the majority of employees, "did not
intend to confer plenary power upon the union to sacrifice, for the benefit
of its members, rights of the minority of the craft, without imposing on it
any duty to protect the minority."''1 1 Otherwise "the minority would be left
with no means of protecting their interests or, indeed, their right to earn
a livelihood by pursuing the occupation in which they are employed.' 22
The Court thus recognized the power over person's lives wielded by a union,
It extended the argument for the union's public responsibility (correspond-
ing to its public power) even further, by demanding that the union grant
equal protection to all members of the craft in the same manner "as the
Constitution imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection to the inter-
ests of those for whom it legislates." The union has powers "comparable
to those possessed by a legislative body." Therefore hostile discrimination,
such as racial discrimination, by a union was declared to be "obviously
irrelevant and invidious.' 1
18Yazoo & M. V. R. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931).
"19Yazoo & M. V. R. v. Webb, 64 F. (2d) 902 (C. C. A. 5th, 1933).
12 oSteele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U. S. -, 65 Sup. Ct. 226 (1944) ; Tunstall
v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, id. at -, 65 Sup. Ct. at 235.
'
21 Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R. 323 U. S. -, 65 Sup. Ct. 226, 230 (1944).
1221d. at -- 65 Sup. Ct. at 231.
123d. at - 65 Sup. Ct. at 232.
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Mr. Justice Murphy, concurring (there was no dissent), felt even more
strongly about the problem. While holding that a union was "essentially a
private organization,"'124 he emphasized that the exclusive character of the
union's bargaining power was "derived solely from Congress" and that
it could not be assumed that Congress meant to authorize the union to violate
the Fifth Amendment.12 5 Mr. Justice Murphy thus denies the public charac-
ter of unions but implies, by a novel interpretation of the Constitution, that
civil rights are protected against encroachment by private organizations as
well as against acts of the government.
While it" cannot be claimed that the issue of the right to work, as against
fellow-workers, is firmly settled by these decisions, so much may be said:
a union which refuses admission to membership arbitrarily, while at the
same time dominating the labor market in a fairly exclusive manner, creates
a monopoly in conflict with public policy. We have come a long way in
recognizing the closed shop as a legitimate means to raise labor standards.
In recognizing it, we have recognized, likewise, the lawful character of a
strike to defend a closed-shop agreement. But, on the other hand, it is
established that strikes directed against fully qualified non-union workers
may have as their sole purpose hurting them without any appreciable advan-
tage to the strikers. Such strikes constitute an actionable wrong.
If, while dominating the labor market, a union admits members freely,
but discriminates among its membership arbitrarily as to job opportunities,
it misuses its power contrary to public policy. Union membership is recog-
nized as being of literally vital importance to the worker in many branches
of trade.
It is erroneous to put union membership on the same level as membership
in a bowling club and to leave untrammeled the union's power to refuse
admission. A distinction must be made because of the economic consequences
of the refusal in the case of the union, as compared to the social consequences
of a bowling club's refusal to admit members. The former may lead to starva-
tion or sub-standard earnings, while the latter will frequently entail merely
an injury to social pride.126
124Id. at -, 65 Sup. Ct. at 235.
1251d. at -- 65 Sup. Ct. at 235.
126After these lines were written, the Supreme Court of California handed down a
unanimous decision which ruled that a labor union which maintained a closed shop must
not be conducted as a closed union. Where the union has attained a monopoly of the
supply of labor by means of closed-shop agreements and other forms of collective labor
action, the union occupies a quasi-public position and has certain corresponding obli-
gations. This means that it may not "claim the freedom from legal restraint enjoyed
by golf clubs or fraternal associations. Its asserted right to choose its members does
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The realization is growing that powerful organizations, though established
on a private basis, may, in the course of time, grow into public or quasi-
public agencies. The long struggle between the Democratic Party in Texas
and the Supreme Court over the Texas "White Primaries" is a case in
point. In the well known case of Smith v. Allwright,1 27 the Supreme Court
rejected the contention that the Democratic Party in Texas was a "voluntary
association", that could bar applicants at will. Membership in the party
might not be a right, but a privilege; however, when "that privilege is also
the essentihl qualification for voting in a primary to select nominees for
a general election, the State makes the action of the party the action of the
State."128
If we apply this reasoning to the role of unions at the present time, the
similarity of the situations is striking. While the unions, in their initial stage
of development, might justly have been considered private associations for
the promotion of their members' interests, this is no longer so. The closed-
shop agreements, as approved by the Wagner Act, may be deemed a legiti-
mate protection of the unions' hard-won standards of employment condi-
tions. It seems fair to limit the advantages of a collective agreement to those
who live up to union standards of skill and are ready to back the union in
times of stress by solidarity of action, while those who kept aloof from the
union are barred from reaping the advantages of the collective agreement.
If, however, the closed shop spreads over a whole industry or a sizable part
of it and at the same time the union's doors are slammed shut fo "new-
comers," however willing to make amends for their tardiness in joining, a
situation arises where the union becomes an entrenched interest within the
state, which, by its ability to determine the means of livelihood of a Worker,
practically wields over him the power of life and death. By having, on the
one hand, the right to conclude a closed-shop agreement protected by statute,
while, on the other hand, held to be a private association that may grant or
refuse admission at will, the union becomes an organization too powerful
not to be regulated by law. If the privilege of voting is stronger than the
alleged voluntary character of a monopolistic political party, the right to
work, which is the basis of human existence, must be considered as even
not merely relate to social relations; it affects the fundamental right to work for a
living."
On the basis of this reasoning the court held that in this case either the union must
admit Negroes on equal terms with white persons or refrain from enforcing the closed-
shop agreement against Negroes. The latter alternative was directed against the em-
ployer as well. N: Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1945, p. 11, col. 4.
127321 U. S. 649, 64 Sup. Ct. 757 (1944).
1281d. at 664-665, 64 Sup. Ct. at 765.
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more fundamentally deserving of protection. As little as the political party,
whose organs determine the participants in an election, remains on a level
with a bowling club, so little may a union dominating the labor market be
considered free to decline admission to qualified applicants. This is, of course,
not merely a question of racial discrimination; it is a question of any indi-
vidual's right to make an honest living.
The unsettled character of the situation is demonstrated by a recent
Florida decision. Discussing the legal situation under a closed-shop agree-
ment, the court admitted that "every man and woman not lawfully incar-
cerated or otherwise incapacitated" had "the right to work and earn a liveli-
hood." However, the decision continued: "It does not follow that all have
the right to require any particular person, form or corporation to give them
employment as a matter of right of contract between the employer and the
employee."'' 1
On the other hand it seems that where it is a matter less of membership
in a union than of exclusiveness of representation by a union, the individual
is well protected against discrimination by the labor organization. The latter
case must be distinguished from the "closed shop--closed union" cases.
The Fair Employment Practice Bills, as introduced in the Seventy-Eighth
Congress, went a long way toward protecting this right. Considering the
growth of the unions beyond state lines, the power of the federal legislature
to intervene can hardly be doubted. Even more sweeping measures might
be taken in due course to prevent any sort of arbitrary refusal by unions
to admit members. To tolerate the establishment of unions as impenetrable
guilds would be un-American in the highest degree. They are as little en-
titled to untrammeled power over the public as a whole as are large
corporations.
A weak advance in this field can be noticed in a few state laws. Under
the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act, the Employment Relations Board
(whose functions resemble those of the National Labor Relations Board)
may terminate an "all-union" agreement whenever it finds that the labor
organization "has unreasonably refused to receive as a member any em-
ployee" of the employer with whom the agreement was concluded.130 Simi-
larly the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Act' 31 permits closed-shop agreements
only if the labor organization involved "does not deny membership in its
'
2 9Irnernational Ass'n of Machinists v. State, 153 Fla. 672, 683, 15 So. (2d) 485, 491
(1943).
130WIs. LAWs 1939, c. 57, Wis. STAT. (1941) § 111.06, 1 (c), second sentence.
231PA. LAws 1937, No. 294, PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 43 § 211, 6 (c).
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organization to a person or persons who are employees of the employer at
the time of the making of such agreement." These state laws obviously do
not protect the non-union worker who is not an employee of the employer
at the time the closed-shop agreement is entered into, but only the non-union
worker who happens to be already employed at such time. The unions are
not required to accommodate "newcomers" in the field. This gap should be
filled by federal and state legislation in the respective fields of the national
and state governments.
To some extent anti-discriminatory legislation has been brought about by
the necessities of war. New York, 3 2 New Jersey,1'3 and Illinois 34 outlaV
racial discrimination in the hiring of employees by war contractors. New
York, furthermore, forbids racial discrimination by labor organizations and
imposes a penalty, to be recovered by the aggrieved person, upon violators
of the law. 13 Nebraska enjoins unions from negotiating collective agree-
ments that discriminate against workers on account of their race or color,
and charges the state department of labor with enforcing this policy "in
conformity with Article I of the constitution of Nebraska and section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of
Ainerica,"3 6 thus applying the Constitution to a violation of civil rights by
private associations. Kansas denies the right to be a bargaining agent to a
union which "discriminates against, or bars, or excludes from its membership
any person because of his race or color" but excepts the transportation
industry. 3 7
The controversy about alleged or real abuses of the closed shop recently
has led to the proposition of constitutional amendments outlawing the closed
shop in several states. While amendments to this effect were voted in
Arkansas and Florida on November 7, 1944, the voters of California rejected
the anti-closed shop proposition. 3 8 At any rate, while the trend is worth
noticing, state constitutions or statutes banning the closed shop will be
largely ineffective as long as the National Labor Relations Act protects it.
Senator Dennis Chavez has already reintroduced his Fair Employment
Practice bill;139 so it seems that the idea of protecting the right to a job
132N. Y. LAWS 1941, c. 478, § 1, amended, LAws 1942, c. 676, § 1, N. Y. CIVIL RIGHTS
LAW § 44.
13 3N. J. LAwS 1942, c. 114, p. 387, §§ 1-3, N. J. STAT. ANN. (1939) 10:1-10 to 10:1-12.
M
4 ILL. LAws 1941 c. 557, §§ 1-7, ILL. ANN. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1931) c. 29, §§ 24 a-g.
'35N. Y. LAWS 1940, c. 9, § 1, N. Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 43.
'
36 NFa. LAWS 1941, c. 96, p. 406, NEB. COMP. STAT. (Supp. 1941) § 48-801. Italics
supplied.
13 7 KAN. LAWS 1941, c. 265, § 1, p. 428, KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1941) § 44-801.
138N. Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1944, p. 15, col. 3.
139Ithaca Journal. Dec. -7, 1944, p. 1, col. 3.
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both against employers and against unions has taken a firm hold in the
mind of our legislators. However, in offering protection against racial
and religious discrimination, the bills proposed thus far fall short of
the wishes of another group complaining of discrimination, the women of
America. The problem of women's right to work is still unsolved and leaders
of women's organizations complain bitterly of the advantage granted to racial
and religious minority groups over American women.140 They point out that
Negroes were granted the vote 55 years before woman suffrage became part
of the Constitution, and that now again, with regard to discrimination in em-
ployment, the position of Negroes and other racial groups may be improved
before women are given equality in employment with men.
Thus the proposed bills, while constitutionally sound, are likely to run into
opposition not only from those who think the bills go too far toward govern-
ment control, but also from those who claim that the bills do not go far
enough toward establishing true equality of economic opportunity.
140"The Anti-Discrimination Bill," Letter to the Editor, N. Y. Herald-Tribune, Dec.
17, 1944, sec. II, p. 5, cols. 7 and 8.
